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Putative Fathers and Parental Interests: A
Search for Protection
STACY LYNN

HILL*

The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood.'
INTRODUCTION

For the first time in five years, the United States Supreme Court, in the
1988 term, heard a case which challenged the constitutionality of the
statutory treatment of putative fathers2 and the grounds upon which their

parental rights may be terminated.3 In McNamara v. County of San Diego
Department of Social Services, 4 Edward McNamara challenged a California
statute which permitted a trial court to terminate his parental rights despite
the court's findings that he would be a fit parent, and that he had manifested

6
significant interest in obtaining custody upon learning of his child's birth.
Although he tried everything in his power to obtain custody, and by all
accounts would have been a good parent, Edward only saw his daughter
once before she was placed in an adoptive home in accordance with her
mother's request.7 While the Supreme Court eventually dismissed McNamara

for want of a properly presented federal question,8 the case provides an

* J.D., 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1987, St. Mary's
College.
1. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). The United States
Supreme Court did not abandon its position on gender roles when it entered the twentieth
century. As late as the 1960s the Court articulated a view of woman as sole keeper of the
familial flame and caretaker of both children and home: "Despite the enlightened emancipation
of wom[a]n... [she] is still regarded as the center of home and family life." Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961).
2. The term "putative father" refers to "[t]he alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate
child." BLACK's LAw DicTONAo
Y 1113 (5th ed. 1979).
3. The Supreme Court Preview of the American Bar Association Journalstated that the
case, "the first of its kind to be considered by the Court, hingeld] on whether terminating
the parental rights of an unwed father who is otherwise fit to be a parent violates his right
to equal protection under the laws." Neal, Supreme Court Preview, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988,
at 36.
4. 488 U.S. 152 (1988).
5. CAL. CrviL CODE § 7017 (West 1983).
6. In re Baby Girl M, 37 Cal. 3d 65, 68, 688 P.2d 918, 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 311
(1984), cert. dismissed sub nom. McNamara, 488 U.S. at 152.
7. Id.
8. 488 U.S. at 152.
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opportunity to evaluate the Court's stance on the parental rights of putative
fathers. 9 In dismissing McNamara, the Court avoided what would have been
the first examination of the constitutional protection of the relationship
between a putative father and his newborn child.' 0
Beginning with Stanley v. Illinois" and ending most recently with Lehr
v. Robertson, 2 the Supreme Court decided a series of cases which addresses
the constitutional rights of putative fathers. "3 Whereas the parent-child
relationship found in the context of marriage or divorce has long received
constitutional protection, the scope of this protection has not been expanded
to include putative fathers.' 4 Instead, the Court has almost entirely subordinated the interests of putative fathers to those of mothers and legally
recognized fathers. 5 While putative fathers have been given a threshold
right to receive notice of legal proceedings, they are not guaranteed the
same veto power over adoption held by the other "parents.' 6 Their ability
to prevent the adoption of their children and the loss of their parental
7
rights directly corresponds to the strength of the parent-child relationship.
This poses a significant problem for putative fathers who were somehow
deprived of all opportunities to establish meaningful relationships with their
children.
One reason for the Court's reluctance to grant putative fathers equal
footing with other "parents" is its perception of "parenthood" as a
formalistic pattern of relations based in the traditional family unit rather
than the biological bond between father and child." This notion of "par-

9. This Note addresses situations in which the mother of an illegitimate child either
relinquishes her parental rights for the child's adoption by a third party; or her parental rights
are terminated by a court, and the putative father desires custody of the child; or the mother
of an illegitimate child subsequently marries someone other than the putative father and wishes
to terminate the putative father's rights so that her husband can adopt the child.
10. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 & n.11 (1979).
11. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
12. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
13. The Court in Lehr identified the relevant cases as Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645, Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) and Caban, 441 U.S. at 380. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 258.
14. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); infra note 44.
15. See infra notes 23-147 and accompanying text.
16. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 ("[Nlothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the
State from withholding from [the putative father] the privilege of vetoing the adoption of [his]
child.").
17. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257, 261-62; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2352
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Allthough an unwed father's biological link to his child
does not, in and of itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that
child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so.").
18. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256-57 ("The institution of marriage has played a critical role
both in defining the legal entitlements of family members and in developing the decentralized
structure of our democratic society."). This perception continues despite the fact that statistics
point to ever-increasing rates of illegitimate births, single-parent households and divorce. See
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enthood" includes the recognition and acceptance of the duties and responsibilities found in traditional family units. Accordingly, the Court has
granted constitutional protection only to those putative fathers who have
established an actual relationship with their children. 9 This places an almost
insurmountable burden on an interested putative father who never had an
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.
Because the Supreme Court is reluctant if not opposed to expanding the
constitutional rights of putative fathers, 2° states must protect putative fathers' interests with statutory provisions. Under current Supreme Court
doctrine, states have almost complete discretion to determine the amount

of notice a putative father must receive of proceedings held to terminate
his parental rights, and to decide whether a putative father's consent in an

adoption proceeding will be necessary. 21 In the past, states have used this
broad latitude to facilitate termination of the parental rights of putative
fathers. States appear to have relied on the stereotypical perception of the

putative father as irresponsible, uninterested and absent to justify retention
of statutory classifications that give putative fathers few rights. 2 However,
by revising their statutes to give more notice and consent rights, states can
eliminate unjustifiable gender-based discrimination and effectively balance
the interests of all parties. It is possible to strengthen the putative father's
rights without jeopardizing either the state's or the mother's interests. In
doing so, states can promote several beneficial goals: preserve, where

D. Bootr, THE PopuLATioN OF rH UNmrED STATEs-HIsToRICAL TRENDS AND FuTuRE PRo-

276 (1985) ("Since 1940 the out-of-wedlock birth ratio has risen fivefold" and "[a]s
of 1981 one child in six in the United States was born out of wedlock."); id. at 184-88 ("The
number of divorces in 1980 was 68 percent greater than in 1970, and the general divorce rate
increased by 52 percent."). There has been a societal revolution in the past forty to fifty years
which has not been reflected in the Court's decisions. While the Court has struck down statutes
which penalize a child solely on the basis of his illegitimacy, see, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court has not incorporated changes in societal views visA-vis co-habitation, extra-marital relationships and single parent-by-choice households to remove
legal barriers faced by the father of such a child. It can no longer be said with certainty that
a putative father obtains such a position by choice. As society evolves and acceptance of single
parenthood grows, it becomes less acceptable to penalize putative fathers for situations they
may be unable to change.
19. See infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
20. See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2341-42 (The Court "attempt[s] to limit and guide
interpretation" of the due process clause in areas which include the constitutional protection
of parental rights, by requiring that "the asserted liberty interest be rooted in history and
tradition."); see also Raab, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathers and Adoption-How Much
Process LsDue?, 7 HAtv. WomEN's L.J. 265, 272 (1984) (the result in Lehr "generated an
inequitable result which was not dictated by earlier decisions on'unwed fathers' rights.").
21. See infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
22. See Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293, 316-17 & nn.97-100 (1988)
(a putative father faces statutes which are "rigorous, facilitating the ability of the unmarried
mother to place her child for adoption."); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257 ("[S]tate laws almost
universally express an appropriate preference for the formal family.").
IECTIONS
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possible, the integrity of the biological parent-child relationship, avoid
challenges to adoption decrees by putative fathers who have been denied
notice and avoid cases such as McNamara.
In order to understand why the Court has subordinated the putative
father's role, it is necessary to examine the Court's perception of "parenthood." Part I of this Note will examine those cases which form the
foundation of the Court's position and indicate how this position fails to
protect the interests of putative fathers. Part II of this Note will offer
recommendations for statutory provisions which will better serve the interests
of all parties involved. States cannot justify statutory schemes that, instead
of creating a balance between conflicting interests, rely on gender stereotypes
to deny the putative father a role in his child's life.
I.

"PARENTHOOD,"

PUTATIVE FATHERS AND THE SUPREME COURT

Throughout history putative fathers have been relegated to an inferior
parental status which has received little, if any, legal recognition. At common
law, a putative father's biological relationship with his child provided him
with virtually no legal rights. 2 At the beginning of the 1990s little has
changed for putative fathers. To date, the Supreme Court has firmly
established that the mere existence of a biological link between a putative
father and his child does not, by itself, warrant strenuous constitutional
protection. 24 While a putative father has a threshold due process right to
receive notice of legal proceedings before his parental rights are terminated,
this does not require actual notice but only a reasonable attempt in light
of the circumstances. 25 Once notice is given, the putative father may be
given the opportunity to argue against the termination of his rights. However, there is no requirement that he be given the same veto power as the
mother and legally recognized father. 26
The cases which have defined the Court's position in this area are Stanley
v. Illinois,27 Quilloin v. Walcott,28 Caban v. Mohammed2 and Lehr v.
Robertson. ° By examining these cases, analyzing both the language of the
opinions and the legal conclusions, this Note will show that the Supreme

23. See Comment, Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers'Rights: A Psychological Parenthood Perspective, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 290, 294-98 (1985); Note, Unwed
Fathers: An Analytical Survey of Their Parental Rights and Obligations, 4 WASH. U.L.Q.
1029, 1029 n.1 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Analytic Survey].
24. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) ("[T]he mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent ... constitutional protection.").
25. Id. at 265.
26. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
27. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
28. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
29. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
30. 463 U.S. at 248.
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Court's doctrine rests on a stereotypical perception of putative fathers and
as such fails to protect their legitimate interests. The Court has chosen to
base its philosophy of "parenthood" on traits found in traditional familybased units instead of in the biological ties between a parent and child.3
The Court has determined that gender-based classifications in statutory
schemes concerned with the adoption of illegitimate children do not violate
equal protection principles when the classifications bear a substantial relation
to the state's articulated interests.12 Thus, a statute which does not require
a putative father's consent to the adoption of his child, but which requires
the consent of other categories of "parents," will withstand constitutional
scrutiny if the classification is based on real differences 33between the various
"parents" which are important to the state's interests.
A.

Stanley v. Illinois

The Supreme Court first addressed the due process and equal protection
rights of putative fathers in Stanley v. Illinois3 4 where the Court held that
putative fathers do enjoy at least minimal parental rights. Some commentators viewed certain dicta in Stanley as a sign that the Court "might be
adopting a major change in attitude toward informal marriages and that all
unwed fathers might thereafter have all the rights of married fathers. ' 35
While this interpretation of Stanley proved to be far too expansive in light
of later decisions, the36Court did recognize the existence of some rights held
by a putative father.
Joan and Peter Stanley, while not legally married, lived together as
husband and wife "intermittently" for eighteen years and had three children

31. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1989) (the Court characterizes

the rationale of Stanley, Quilloin, Caban and Lehr as "restling] ...upon the historic respectindeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships
that develop within the unitary family." The "unitary family" is "typified, of course, by the

marital family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children." Id.
at 2342 n.3).
32. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the state's interests,
see In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511

(1975).
33. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265-68.
34. 405 U.S. at 645.
35. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus of Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing

the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. Ray. 463, 497 (1983) (quoting dicta, "Nor
has the law refused to recognize those family relationships uniegitimized by a marriage

ceremony." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651).
36. We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a

hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and
that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose
custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal

protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
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during their relationship. 7 When Joan Stanley died, the children were
declared wards of the state, removed from their father's care, and placed
with court-appointed guardians. 3 Stanley argued that he had never been
found to be an unfit parent, and because married fathers and unwed mothers
could not lose their parental rights absent such a finding, he had been
39
deprived of the equal protection of the law.
The Supreme Court confronted the question of whether "a presumption
that distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers [is] constitutionally repugnant.' '4 It held that Stanley was "entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a
parent before his children were taken from him ' 41 as a matter of due
process. The Court also held that as a result of its decision requiring that
all parents be afforded a hearing before the termination of their parental
rights, it was a violation of equal protection laws to deny Stanley a42 "fitness"
hearing while extending such a right to other classes of parents.
In considering the due process argument, the Court did not challenge the
parties' legitimate interests, only the method used to achieve them. The
Court recognized Stanley's interest in his children as "cognizable and
substantial," 43 and noted that constitutional protection of the family had
been extended to "relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.""
It also recognized the legitimacy of the state's interest in protecting " 'the
moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best
interests of the community [and in] strengthen[ing] the minor's family ties
whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when
his welfare or safety' " require it. 41 While the Court agreed with the state

37. Id. at 646.
38. Under Illinois law, illegitimate children became wards of the State upon the death of
the mother. Id.
39. Id. The definition attributed to the term "parent" by the state did not include putative
fathers. It did, however, include both parents of a legitimate child, adoptive parents, and the
natural mother of an illegitimate child. Id. at 650. While that statutorily-defined group of
persons could not be deprived of their children without proof of unfitness, "an unwed father
[was] uniquely subject to the more simplistic dependency proceeding ... [and] the State, on
showing that the father was not married to the mother, need not prove unfitness in fact,
because it [was] presumed at law." Id.
40. Id. at 649.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Court noted that if Stanley were a fit parent it would be contrary to the state's
self-articulated interests to remove his children from his custody. Thus, it would be in the
state's own "best interests" to grant Stanley a neglect proceeding to determine his fitness as
a parent. Id. at 652-53.
43. Id. at 652.
44. Id. at 651. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968); Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968). The family unit has found protection
in the due process clause, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and the
ninth amendment, see generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (quoting 1965 Ill. Laws 2585 (repealed)).
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that some putative fathers may be unfit parents, it rejected the state's
presumption of unfitness and noted that "some [putative fathers] are wholly
suited to have custody of their children."' ' If Stanley had been given the
opportunity to demonstrate his fitness as a parent, the state's interests would
have been furthered by allowing the children to stay with him. The Court
concluded that "Itihe State's interest in caring for Stanley's children is de
minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father," 47 and therefore Stanley
should have been granted a hearing to determine his fitness in order to
preserve his due process rights.
Although the Court found some parental interests for putative fathers, it
did not recognize an independent interest based solely on the biological
relationship between a putative father and his children. Instead, the Court
merely recognized the existence of a de facto family unit and extended some
48
measure of due process protection to a previously established relationship.
The Court emphasized its reliance on parental duty and responsibility by
characterizing Stanley's interest as keeping "the children he has sired and
raised," ' 49 and preventing the "dismemberment of his family." 50 Noting that
the integrity of the family unit has found constitutional protection even
without the legitimization of marriage, the Court explained that "familial
bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and important as those
arising within a more formally organized family unit."' S Regrettably, howinterest in preserving the biological relaever, the Court ignored Stanley's
52
tionship with his children.

46. Id. at 654.
47. Id. at 657-58.
48. This recognition of a procedural due process right was articulated in the oft-cited,
infamous "Footnote 9." The footnote reads, in pertinent part: "Extending opportunity for
hearing to unwed fathers who desire and claim competence to care for their children creates

no constitutional or procedural obstacle to foreclosing those unwed fathers who are not so
inclined." Id. at 657 n.9 (emphasis added); see Barron, Notice to the Unwed Fathers and
Termination of ParentalRights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAm. L.Q. 527, 528 (1975).

49. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
50. Id. at 658.
51. Id. at 652.

52. The dissent did not recognize the importance of the biological bond and, additionally,
Chief Justice Burger largely discounted the de facto family relationship enjoyed by Stanley
and his children. He noted that Stanley had turned his children over to another couple shortly
after their mother's death and took no action to become their legal guardian. Instead, he
asked only that "legal responsibility [for his children] be given to no one else." Id. at 667

(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Stanley "seemed ... to be concerned with the loss of the welfare
payments he would suffer as a result of the designation of others as guardians of the children."
Id. In addition, Stanley failed to avail himself of the legal means of securing custody of his
children and more. specifically, Joan and Peter Stanley had not been legally married. Id. at
666-67.
The Chief Justice noted that marriage is a relationship of roles and responsibilities, and that
"it is in law an essentially contractualrelationship, the parties to which have legally enforceable
rights and duties, with respect to both each other and to any children born to them." Id. at
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Quilloin v. Walcott

When the Court decided Quilloin v. Walcott53 six years later, it addressed
the question left unanswered in Stanley: "[T]he degree of protection a State
must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a situation, such as presented
here, in which the countervailing interests are more substantial. ' 54 The
Court in Stanley had balanced Stanley's interests with those of the state
finding support for his claim in the long-term relationship enjoyed with his
child. 55 Quilloin, however, did not enjoy the same type of relationship and
this arguably diminished the strength of his claim for the Court.
Ardell Walcott and Leon Quilloin were never married nor did they live
together as husband and wife.5 6 The couple's child remained in Walcott's
care his entire life. 57 Eventually, Walcott married another man and consented
to her husband's adoption of her son.58 Quilloin attempted to prevent the
adoption and secure visitation rights, although he did not seek custody of
5 9
his son nor did he object to his son living with Walcott and her husband.
The trial court granted the adoption petition over Quilloin's objections and
without finding Quilloin to be an unfit parent 0 Quilloin appealed and
argued that the application of the "best interests of the child" standard
violated his due process rights. 6' He also argued that as a matter of equal
protection, he should have the same veto power over the adoption of his

663 (emphasis added). Absent a marital relationship, the Chief Justice characterized the
differences between parents as the fact that unwed mothers are easily identifiable whereas
putative fathers "are not traditionally quite so easy to identify and locate," id. at 665, they
are either disinterested or unaware of their status as such, and "the biological role of the
mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds ...than the bonds resulting
from the male's often casual encounter." Id. Support for this position was taken from
"[c]enturies of human experience." Id. at 666.
Thus, the Chief Justice believed that a distinction between putative fathers and other
"parents" is justified in light of the innate differences between the two types of parents. This
position presupposes that only persons within a legally recognized relationship possess the
requisite commitment and dedication to partner and child to warrant full constitutional
protection. He generalized putative fathers as being men who "either deny all responsibility
or exhibit no interest in the child or its welfare." Id. at 665. This characterization of the
male's interest or participation in the conception of his child is an additional indication of the
value judgment members of the Court have made in the comparison of the parental roles.
53. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
54. Id. at 248. "[U]nlike the father in Stanley, appellant had never been a defacto member
of the child's family unit." Id. at 253.
55. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652-53, 657-58.
56. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.

57. Id. Although Quilloin never took steps to legitimate his son, he was listed as the father
on the child's birth certificate. Id. at 249 n.6.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 250-51.
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child as unwed mothers, married parents and divorced parents. 62 The Georgia
Supreme Court, however, upheld the petition relying generally on the state
policy of encouraging the raising of children in a family setting-an interest
which, the state argued, might be substantially hindered if adoptions could
63
not be granted absent the putative father's consent.

The due process issue in Quilloin was whether the putative father's
interests were adequately protected by a statutory scheme which allowed his
interests to be terminated by employing a "best interests of the child"

standard. 64 The Court held that the application of the standard did not
constitute a violation of Quilloin's due process rights in this case and under

these circumstances. 6 The Court admitted that a violation would occur if
the statutory scheme attempted to "force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing
of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the

children's best interest."66 Quilloin, however, was not in that position. He
had never "had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child," 67 nor was
his son being placed with an unrelated third party. The adoption decree
simply gave legal recognition to a de facto family unit which had existed
6
for almost ten years. 1
The Court also examined and rejected Quilloin's equal protection argument. Quilloin contended that "his authority to veto an adoption [should]
be measured by the same standard that would have been applied to a
married father. ' 69 The Court, however, found that as a putative father, his
interests were "readily distinguishable" from those of a wed father and the
70
state was within its power to provide Quilloin with a lesser veto power.

The Court compared a wed father and a putative father and noted the

62. Under Georgia law, for a putative father to obtain the same veto power over the
adoption of his children as other types of parents, he first had to legitimate his children by
either marrying the mother and legitimating the children or by obtaining a court order. Id. at
249.
63. Id. at 252. The court emphasized that the state's policy interest had added weight
because Walcott sought the adoption in order to give legal recognition to a de facto family
unit which had never included the putative father. Id. The court reasoned that had the adoption
been blocked, the child would have been removed from a traditional family setting, thus acting
in opposition to the state's own interests. Id.
64. Id. at 254. For a discussion of the "best interests of the child" standard and its
application in these cases, see Weston, Putative Fathers' Rights to Custody-A Rocky Road
at Best, 10 WHrrR L. Rav. 683, 697-700 (1989).
65. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254.
66. Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. However, the Court left unanswered the question of what might be required in a third
party placement, stating only that in Quilloin's situation the "best interests of the child"
standard was constitutionally applied. Id.
69. Id. at 255-56.
70. Id. at 256.
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differences between the two. The Court found that the marital relationship

itself endowed the wed father with those qualities and responsibilities which
set him apart from the putative father. 71 In particular, the Court noted that

unlike a wed father, Quilloin had "never exercised actual or legal custody
over his child, and thus ha[d] never shouldered any significant responsibility
with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child. 17 2 Thus, for the Court, the threshold question is whether a substantial
relational connection exists between a parent and a child rather than whether
73
there is a biological relationship.
While the Court believes putative fathers deserve some procedural due
process protection, it does not believe that the biological relationship between
putative fathers and their illegitimate children independently merits more
than threshold equal protection and due process protection. In fact, Quilloin

limits the seemingly broad and expansive paternal rights recognized in
Stanley.7 4 This limitation stems from the Court's understanding of those
parental roles and rights which were first articulated in Stanley.75 In both
Stanley and Quilloin, the Court has shown great deference to the de facto
family unit and inter-personal relationships established over time through a

lasting and substantial affiliation.76 While the putative father in Stanley
received protection based on his eighteen-year familial association with his
children and their mother, the Court in Quilloin gave that same protection
to a de facto family unit of nine years which included a stepfather as well
as the natural mother. 77 The Court's insistence upon a familial relationship
demonstrates that it is not inclined to give constitutional protection to a

71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis added). The only interest shared by Quilloin and a wed father was
financial. Quilloin was subject to a child-support obligation prior to these proceedings. Id.
73. See Note, The Putative Father's ParentalRights: A Focus on "Family," 58 NEB. L.
REv. 610, 618-22 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Focus] for a discussion of the concept of psychological parenthood and its place in these types of cases. A "psychological parent" has been
defined as "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the
child's physical needs." Id. at 618 (quoting J.GoLDSTmN, A. FREUD & A. SoI-rr, BEYoND

TE

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

98 (1973)). The Court refused to adopt the psychological

parenthood theory in the context of the foster parent-child relationship in Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). However, it seems to have embraced the concept in
the context of determining the constitutional protection due the biological parent-child relationship. See Note, Focus, supra at 618. Cf. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 n.18 ("[W]e [the Court]
need not take sides in the ongoing debate among family psychologists over the relative weight
to be accorded biological ties and psychological ties.").
74. Note, Adoption: The Rights of the Putative Father, 37 OKLA. L. R-v. 583, 586 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Adoption]. But cf. Note, Focus, supra note 73, at 617-18 (posing the
question whether the result in Quilloin is a reflection of the unusual fact pattern or if the
policies articulated are central to all such cases).
75. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 48-52, 66-68 and accompanying text.
77. The strength of the de facto family unit was such that the child wished to be adopted
by his stepfather and take the name "Walcott." Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251.
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claim based solely on an independent biological relationship between a
putative father and his child. Absent some affirmative action by the putative
father to acknowledge and78accept his responsibilities, he will receive minimal

Constitutional protection.

C.

Caban v. Mohammed

The Court next addressed the rights of putative fathers in Caban v.
Mohammed.79 In Caban, the Court reiterated its position that putative
fathers' rights are dependent upon the steps they take to establish a

relationship with their children.80 Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived
together for five years and "represented themselves as being husband and

wife, although they never legally married." ' The couple had two children
and Caban was listed as the father on both birth certificates. Caban lived
with the children as their father and supported them until his relationship
with Mohammed ended, at which time Mohammed moved in with the man
whom she later married.82 Caban continued to pursue his relationship with
his children as best he could. 3
In 1976, Mohammed and her husband filed a petition to adopt the
children, while Caban and his wife cross-petitioned. The trial court granted
Mohammed's petition and terminated Caban's parental rights.8 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, Caban made an equal protection
argument challenging the distinction drawn by8 5the New York statute between
a putative father and other types of parents.
78. See supra notes 48-52, 64-73 and accompanying text; see infra notes 94-97, 108-31 and
accompanying text.
79. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
80. Id. at 389 & n.7.
81. Id. at 382.
82. Id.
83. He was able to see them each weekend when they visited their maternal grandmother;
when the children moved to Puerto Rico, he communicated with them through his parents,
who also lived in Puerto Rico. Id.
84. Id. at 383-84.
85. Id. at 385. The statute at issue, § III of the New York Domestic Relations Law, as
amended by 1975 N.Y. Laws, chs. 246 & 704, provided, in part, that "consent to adoption
shall be required as follows ....Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant,
of a child conceived or born in wedlock ....

Of the mother ... of a child born out of

wedlock," but not the consent of the putative father. In addition, Caban argued that Quilloin,
434 U.S. at 246, "recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental
relationship with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as parents." Caban, 441
U.S. at 385. Caban did not argue that he was denied due process as required by Stanley, 405
U.S. at 645, since he was given notice and allowed to participate at the hearing as a party in
the adoption proceeding. The Court did not decide the case on the basis of the substantive
due process argument. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394 n.16 ("[W]e similarly express no view as to
whether a State is constitutionally barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a
determination that the parent whose rights are being terminated is unfit.").
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The Court found that the statutory scheme treated unwed parents differently solely on the basis of gender. 6 The statutory scheme involved in
Caban required the consent of both parents of a child born in wedlock and
vested absolute veto power in the unwed mother, subject to a few express
exceptions.8 7 The putative father, however, had no such power even if he
had established a substantial relationship with his child, as had Caban. A
putative father's only chance to prevent the adoption was to show that it
was not in the child's best interests."8
In order for a gender-based distinction to withstand an equal protection
challenge, the distinction "must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." ' 9 The
appellees argued that the distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers was justified by the fundamental differences between maternal and
paternal relations.9 The Court rejected this argument noting that "[e]ven
if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn
infants, this generalization ... would become less acceptable ... as the
age of the child increased." 91 Using Caban as an example, the Court noted
that Caban, Mohammed, and their children lived as a family for several
years and that both parents took part in the care, support and supervision
of the children. 92 Thus, Caban's relationship with his children "demonstrate[d] that an unwed father may have a relationship with his children
fully comparable to that of the mother." 93
While the Court struck down the statute for drawing an impermissible
distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, it did not hold
unconstitutional statutes which would withhold veto power over adoptions
from unwed fathers who did not come forward and assert their rights as

86. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
87. See id.at 385-86 n.4. Section 111 provided:
The consent shall not be required of a parent who has abandoned the child or
who has surrendered the child .. .or who has been deprived of civil rights or
who is insane or who has been judicially declared incompetent or who is mentally
retarded ... or who has been adjudged to be an habitual drunkard.

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § Ill (McKinney 1977).
88. Caban, 441 U.S. at 387. The possibility of accomplishing this seems minimal. In fact,
the trial court had found that:
There is absolutely no evidence, credible or otherwise, that the new marriage of
the natural mother is other than solid or permanent; and no evidence whatsoever
that the children are not well-cared for and healthy. Nothing therefore justifies
a denial of the petition other than the putative father professes that he loves the
children.... That is not enough no matter how sincerely motivated.
Note, Adoption, supra note 74, at 587-88 n.39.
89. Caban, 441 U.S. at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
90. Id. (arguing that "a natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer
relationship with her child .. .than a father does." Id. (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 41)).
91. Id. at 389.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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fathers. 94 As it had in Stanley and Quilloin, the Court in Caban predicated
the putative father's rights upon an existing and substantial relationship
such as a de facto family unit. 95 A putative father's interest in his child,

according to the Court, does not automatically come into force at the
moment of the child's birth. Rather, the putative father's rights must be96
triggered by his commitment to a substantial relationship with his child.
This position leaves open the question of what notice must be given a
putative father who is prevented from establishing a relationship with his

child which relationship would preserve his parental interestsY
D.

Lehr v. Robertson

It was in Lehr v. Robertson98 that the Supreme Court addressed the

questions left unanswered by Caban.99 In Lehr, the Court determined the
extent of a putative father's right to notice of an adoption proceeding when
the putative father has not established a relationship with his child. 10 The
94. Id. at 392.
95. See supra notes 34-78 and accompanying text. While the majority gave putative fathers
a certain degree of protection once they established a substantial relationship with their
children, Justice Stewart, writing in dissent, did not even concede that a right to maintain a
parental relationship exists. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Parental rights
do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child."). The
measure of the putative father's rights must be gauged by non-biological factors, the most
traditional being the familial relationship created through marriage. Where the interests of the
unwed mother and putative father are in conflict, he wrote that "the absence of a legal tie
with the mother may in such circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive
constitutional claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father's actual relationship with
the children." Id. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, echoed Justice Stewart when he argued
that there are real differences between unwed mothers and putative fathers, and that fact
alone justifies many of the distinctions made between the two. Id. at 404-07 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Unlike the identity of the unwed father, the identity of the mother is hardly ever
in doubt and "it is virtually inevitable that from conception through infancy the mother will
constantly be faced with decisions about how best to care for the child ....

."

Id. at 406

(Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
955, 993 (1984) (the stereotype of the responsible mother not always accurate). That the
distinction may appear arbitrary in some situations, such as Caban's, does not justify invalidation of the statute since "[w]e cannot test the conformance of rules to the principle of
equality simply by reference to exceptional cases." Caban, 441 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
96. This leaves unanswered the question whether a gender-based distinction "might be
justified in adoptions of newborns because of the special relationship between a mother and
her newborn infant." Note, Adoption, supra note 74, at 589. Nor did the Court consider the
constitutionality of a statute which grants a veto power to only unwed mothers when the
putative father could not be easily identified or located. J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YoUNG,
CoNsrrrunoNm.

LAW

657 (3d ed. 1986).

97. Note, Adoption, supra note 74, at 589.
98. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
99. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
100. A putative father may not establish a relationship with his child for a variety of
reasons. A putative father may not be aware of his child's existence; a proceeding to terminate
parental rights may be held while the child is a newborn when there has been no opportunity
to establish a relationship; the mother may prevent contact with the child; or the putative
father may be uninterested.
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Court found that putative fathers do not have an absolute right to notice
and standing in an adoption proceeding, 01 but only an "opportunity"
interest in establishing a relationship with their children.1 02
Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Robertson lived together before their daughter was born. 0 3 Although Lehr visited the child in the hospital, he did not
live with Robertson after the child's birth, did not provide any financial
support for the child, and was not listed on the birth certificate as the
father. 1 4 Robertson later married and, along with her husband, friled a
petition for adoption. 0 5 Lehr filed a "visitation and paternity petition,"
unaware of the adoption proceedings initiated by Robertson.1 6 He did not
learn of the proceedings until four days before the petition for adoption
10 7
was granted.
The Court confronted both due process and equal protection claims. 08
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, first dealt with the due process claim.
He noted that the interests of the parties must be evaluated to determine
whether they are sufficiently substantial to warrant constitutional protection.'t 9 The most significant interest in these types of cases, argued Justice
Stevens, is the welfare of the children." 0 He noted that "the rights of the
parents are a counterpartof the responsibilities they have assumed.""' This
link between parental duty and parental rights can be traced through a long
line of cases stating that "the relationship of love and duty in a recognized
' 2
family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection. "

101. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.
102. Id. at 262.
.103. Id. at 252.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 250.
106. Id.at 252.
107. Id. at 253. According to Lehr's attorney, "the judge stated that he was aware of the
pending paternity petition but did not believe he was required to give notice to appellant prior
to the entry of the order of adoption." Id. Lehr's paternity suit was later dismissed, and his
petition to vacate the adoption on the grounds that it violated his constitutional rights was
denied by the New York state courts. Id.
108. First, Lehr contended that "a putative father's actual or potential relationship with a
child ... is an interest in liberty which may not be destroyed without due process of law."
Id. at 255. Therefore, he had a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at the adoption
proceeding before he was deprived of that liberty interest. Lehr's second argument was that
the gender-based classification in the statute violated the equal protection clause by giving
putative fathers fewer procedural rights than mothers. Id.
109. Id. at 256. Justice Stevens pointed out that "[t]he intangible fibers that connect parent
and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing
it with strength, beauty, and flexibility." Id.
110. Id.at 257.
111. Id.at 257 (emphasis added).
112. Id.at 258 (emphasis added). These cases include Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
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The Court has upheld the premise that parental rights and responsibilities
are intertwined in each of the cases addressing the rights of putative fathers:
Stanley,"' Quilloin 4 and Caban."5 The Court embraced the belief that
"the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection[] [since t]he actions of judges neither create nor sever
genetic bonds. ' " 6 According to the Court, it is only through the establishment of a continuous and substantial relationship that the parental relationship obtains a protected status.1 7 The existence of a purely biological
relationship simply "offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.""' If the putative
father fails to grasp the opportunity to establish that relationship, the
"Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his
opinion of where the child's best interests lie." 119 Under this narrow view
of putative fathers' due process rights, the only due process question the
Court felt compelled to consider was whether the state had provided
adequate protection for Lehr's opportunity to form a relationship with his
child. 2
The Court held that the New York statutory scheme offered Lehr adequate
notice to protect his "opportunity" interest. The Court found the statute
adequate because it automatically gave notice of legal proceedings to seven
classes of putative fathers "likely to have assumed some responsibility for
the care of their natural children."''2 In addition, the statute allowed putative
fathers to send postcards to a putative father's registry in order to guarantee
notice of any adoption proceedings involving their children.'2 The statute,
therefore, made it possible for putative fathers to seize their opportunity to
establish a relationship with their children and protect their interests. It did
not matter that the trial court and the other parties involved knew Lehr's
identity and location. Lehr's "opportunity" interest and due process rights
were protected by the statute because it provided the means by which he
could insure notice of any legal proceedings.

113. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
116. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
117. Id. at 267-68 ("If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child
and the other parent has ... never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause
does not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights.").
118. Id. at 262 (emphasis added).
119. Id.

120. Id. at 262-63.
121. Id.at 263.
122. The statute provided in part: "The department shall establish a putative father registry
which shall record the names and addresses of... any person who has filed with the registry
before or after the birth of a child out-of-wediock, a notice of intent to claim paternity of
the child .... ." N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 372-c (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
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The Court briefly addressed and then dismissed Lehr's equal protection
argument. 123 Justice Stevens found that the adoption procedures established
by the statute'2 were designed to promote the best interests of the child,
to facilitate the granting of a petition for adoption, and to assure its
finality. 125 In order to achieve these goals, the statute gave only certain
classes of parents authority to veto the adoption. 126 While Lehr argued that
the distinction drawn by the statute between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers was impermissible 27 the Court rejected this contention noting that
"the existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent
and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent
and the best interests of the child."'' Lehr had not established a substantial
relationship with his child and therefore was not deprived of equal protection
under the laws. In the Court's opinion, therefore, Lehr differed significantly
from the putative father in Caban because Lehr had never established a
"custodial, personal, or financial relationship" with his child. 29

The Court's decision in Lehr, constitutes a clear rejection of "the tacit
assumption of Stanley and its progeny that a biological relationship in itself
might warrant some constitutional protection."" 0 By conditioning a putative
father's right to notice of an adoption proceeding on the quality of the
relationship between the putative father and his child, the Court ignores

123. Justice Stevens stated that the theory of equal protection requires simply that the
"sovereign ... not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265 (citing Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
124. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 111, 1ll-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. Soc.
SIERv. LAW § 372-c (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
125. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
126. Id. at 266 (unwed mothers always given veto power whereas only specific types of
putative fathers receive such veto power).
127. Id. at 266.
128. Id. at 266-67. The dissent in Lehr shifted the focus of the analysis toward the biological
ties between a putative father and his child. It took exception to the Court's characterization
of a putative father's interest as being only in the opportunity to establish a relationship with
his child. Justice White, wrote that "[a] 'mere biological relationship' is not as unimportant
in determining the nature of liberty interests as the majority suggests," id. at 271 (White, J.,
dissenting), since the biological connection is a relationship which gives rise to a protected
interest. He characterized the nature of the interest as that of a parent-child relationship and
argued that "how well developed that relationship has become goes to its 'weight,' and not
its 'nature."' Id. at 272 (White, J., dissenting).
According to the dissent, Lehr's interest warranted constitutional protection if the parentchild relationship could be proved, i.e., that Lehr was the biological father, and did not hinge
upon the quality of any other type of relationship which might have been established between
the two. In addition, the dissent disputed the Court's due process analysis, which it characterized
as being "a grudging and crabbed approach to due process." Id. at 275 (White, J., dissenting).
Denying notice to an identifiable father, whose whereabouts were known, could not possibly
serve any substantial state interest. Id.
129. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
130. Raab, supra note 20, at 266. See generally Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OWo ST. L.J. 313 (1984).
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putative fathers' interests based on their biological relationship with their
children.
E.

Conclusions

The analysis of Stanley, Caban, Quilloin and Lehr creates a normative
understanding of the United States Supreme Court's conception of "parenthood" and the relative rights among different classes of "parents."
Simply put, the relationship between a mother and child is created solely
by the biological link between them.'' The father-child relationship, however, is predicated on the legal context within which the relationship exists.3 2
Whereas a wed father's parental rights (as well as those of an adoptive
father) are given full constitutional protection because of his legal status,
the putative
father is set apart in a separate and distinct category of
"parent." '33 He is only given the mantle of "parenthood" once he has
proved his commitment to the relationship. If the putative father acts as
though he were a wed father, espousing those traits the Court attributes to
such men, 34 his interests are deigned worthy of protection.'35 Even then,
the putative father is not guaranteed the same protection as other "parents."
Gender-based classifications giving a putative father inferior or non-existent
veto powers are justified by a finding that the various "parents" are not
similarly situated. The Court has accepted the argument that differences
between these "parents" are sufficient to deny a putative father constitutional protection in favor of the competing interests of the unwed mother
36
and the state.
In Lehr, the Court held that putative fathers have a right to an opportunity
to establish a relationship with their children. However, it is only a right
to an opportunity and this right can be lost if not acted upon. 3 7 Putative

131. Justice Stevens wrote in Caban that while both parents are responsible for conception,
the mother has the greatest impact on the child since she can terminate the pregnancy, decide
whether to inform the father of the pregnancy, or marry a third party and thereby legitimize
the child. It is she who must carry the child and necessarily be present at its birth, creating
between the two a bond not shared by the father. Caban, 441 U.S. at 404-05; see also Stanley,
405 U.S. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he biological role of the mother in carrying
and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting
from the male's often casual encounter.").
132. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663 ("I agree with the State's argument that the Equal
Protection Clause is not violated when Illinois gives full recognition only to those father-child
relationships that arise in the context of family units bound together by legal obligations
arising from marriage or from adoption proceedings." (Burger, C.J., dissenting)); see also
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
133. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 664-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 663 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (marriage as a contractual relationship with
enforceable rights and duties).
135. See supra notes 48-52, 76-80, 95-96, 117-120 and accompanying text.
136. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265-68; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56.
137. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
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fathers can lose their rights without implicating due process considerations
3
if they fail to act within the time or in the manner provided by the statute.
The Court also appears to be very deferential toward statutes that would
appear to infringe on putative fathers' equal protection interests. 3 9 If a
relationship has not been established or is found to be lacking, the interests
of the state override those of the putative fathers. 14 If the relationship is
found to be substantial, and the putative fathers have taken steps to create
bonds with their children by exhibiting the traditional qualities of "fathers,"
their interests will be given greater protection. 41 There is no requirement,
however, that putative fathers be given veto power over an adoption even
if a veto power is given to other "parents."' 1 42 In addition, statutes can also
require application of the "best interests of the child" standard even though
this standard creates a sometimes insurmountable burden on putative fa43
thers.
The Court's position does not adequately protect putative fathers' legitimate interests in their children. The Court requires only that states provide
some mechanism by which putative fathers can receive notice of legal
proceedings. 44 However, states need not provide notice automatically. In
fact, statutes may even require putative fathers to initiate the notice provision
themselves. 4 This position ignores the problem created by imperfect knowledge. Putative fathers are not always aware of the existence of their children
or of the need to act to secure notice of legal proceedings. In addition,
unwed mothers are not required to inform putative fathers of the birth of
their children absent special proceedings.' 46 The absence of such an obligation can result in deception and fraudulent failure to inform the putative
father of the situation. Unwed mothers can actively work to prevent putative
fathers from acquiring knowledge of their children and, thereby, achieve

138. Id. The Court has not addressed the implications of a situation in which putative
fathers are fraudulently denied notice, or fail to receive notice through incomplete service.
139. The Court in Lehr explained the constitutional standard for gender-based classifications
as prohibiting "disparate treatment when there is no substantial relation between the disparity
and an important state purpose." Id. at 266. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71. This is not a difficult standard to satisfy given the
Court's recognition of the importance of the state's interest in its illegitimate children. See
supra note 123-29 and accompanying text.
140. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-68.
141. Id. at 267.
142. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56.
143. See id.at 254-55.
144. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-65.
145. A number of states have enacted putative father registry statutes in the years following
the Court's decision in Lehr. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (1987); Mo. Ray. STAT.
§ 192.016 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-209 (1989).
146. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 273 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). Unless unwed mothers are
under an affirmative duty to inform putative fathers of the existence of the children, they can
withold such information indefinitely, thereby depriving putative fathers the opportunity to
develop a relationship with their children.
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termination of their parental rights without violating due process requirements.
Even if putative fathers receive notice of legal proceedings to terminate
their parental rights, they may not be able to persuade a trial court to
preserve those rights because they are not guaranteed an opportunity to
develop a relationship which would strengthen their position. The Supreme
Court has established that the strength of putative fathers' parental interests
directly corresponds to the strength of the relationship between the putative
fathers and their children. However, the Court has not granted a right to
establish such a relationship. 47 This becomes problematic when considering
the potential for interference from unwed mothers and the special problem
presented by newborn children.
II.

ACHIEVING A BALANCE-COMPETING INTERESTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FuTURE

One way for the Supreme Court to deal with the problem of protecting
putative fathers' interests would be to recognize the biological bond between
the putative father and his children as an independent basis for parental
rights. No longer would the putative father be limited to the quality of the
48
relationship between himself and his children as a source of parental rights.
It is unlikely, however, that the Court will take such an approach. 49 In
addition, a constitutional remedy to this problem is arguably not the best
solution for resolving the competing interests in this area. Such a remedy
would not only have unforeseen, and possibly damaging consequences to
the states' ability to quickly and permanently place illegitimate children,' 50
it would also limit the states' flexibility to create different types of statutes
to deal with various types of issues.' 5'

147. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 128 (the dissent in Lehr argues for the importance of the biological
relationship).
149. The Court has shifted its position vis-A-vis the protection of putative fathers' interests
from the liberal approach taken in Stanley, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, to
the restrictive approach espoused in Lehr. See supra note 101-02 and accompanying text. Even
in Stanley, the Court did not recognize the biological relationship as creating a protected
interest for putative fathers.
150. It has been argued that providing the putative father a veto power equal to that of
the unwed mother would "unnecessarily burden and complicate" the adoption process. Brief
Amicus Curiae of the National Committee for Adoption in Support of Appellee at 8, McNamara
v. County of San Diego Department of Social Services, cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 546 (1988)
(No. 87-5840), ("Unnecessary delay of the adoption undermines the entire statutory scheme
by lessening the chances of adoption and depriving the child of early and unintererrupted
bonding to its parents." Id. at 9).
151. An interest of the state recognized by the court as legitimate and substantial. See
generally In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d
511 (1975).
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Since the Supreme Court is unlikely to, and arguably should not, recognize
a right arising from the biological bond between putative fathers and their
children, the best way to protect putative fathers' interests would be to
revise state statutes. Statutes allow the flexibility necessary to balance
competing interests. 52 While one of the strongest arguments made against
giving putative fathers more rights is that to do so would compromise the
interests of other parties, such a result is not inevitable. In fact, it is possible
that by expanding putative fathers' rights, the interests of other parties
would also be served. The following sections offer recommendations for

drafting statutes which will result in a more balanced consideration of the
1 53
interests at stake.
A.

Due Process Considerations: Notice

It is essential that a putative father receive notice of any legal proceedings
which might affect the relationship with his child so that he can take those
steps necessary to protect the relationship. In order for this to occur, the
identity of the putative father must be revealed. Therefore, statutes should

require the unwed mother to inform the court of the identity of the putative
father. 54 Some argue that such a requirement would infringe upon the
unwed mother's right to privacy, exposing her to embarrassment by requiring

disclosure of her sexual behavior. 55 However, the embarrassment an unwed
mother might experience in providing the name of her child's father is

152. Each party has his or her own interests to protect. The putative father wants to prevent
the termination of his parental rights and enjoy a relationship with his child. The unwed
mother has an interest in protecting the privacy of both herself and her child, as well as an
undefined interest in maintaining control of her childrearing decision by asserting her wishes
concerning the future of her child. See infra note 155. And finally, the state has an interest
in the welfare of its illegitimate children. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. More
specifically, the state's interest lies in speedy placements in adoptive homes and in securing
adoption decrees which are final and not open to challenge by disgruntled parties.
153. Recently, there has been an attempt to draft model uniform legislation to codify the
requirements of Stanley. In 1988, the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act (UPUFA). UNI'. PUTATIVE
AND UNKNoWN FATrnRs ACT, 9B U.L.A. 16 (1988) [hereinafter UPUFA].
154. "Absent special circumstances, there is no bar to requiring the mother of an illegitimate
child to divulge the name of the father when the proceedings at issue involve the permanent
termination of the father's rights." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 273 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
155. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 408-09 & n.17 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[q]uestions relating to the adequacy of notice to absent fathers could invade the mother's
privacy."); Barron, supra note 48, at 537-41; Note, The Uniform Putative and Unknown
FathersAct: Should Putative Fathers Have an Absolute Right to Notice in Adoption Proceedings?, 25 TULSA L.J. 315, 323-26 (1989); Note, Unwed Fathers and the Adoption Process,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 85, 127-29 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Process]. It has also been argued
that the mother has a protected interest in determining her child's future. This interest is
grounded in a privacy-based interest in childrearing decisions. See Erickson, The Feminist
Dilemma Over Unwed Parents' Custody Rights: The Mother's Rights Must Take Priority, 2
LAW & INEQUALITY 447, 456 (1984).
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outweighed by the putative father's interests in obtaining notice.15 6 It is also
outweighed by the child's interest in having an opportunity to enjoy a
relationship with his or her biological father.157 Disclosure also serves the
state's interest in assuring a stable and final adoption decree. A putative
father who is given notice and an opportunity to respond to an adoption
petition will be less likely to appear after the fact to challenge the termination
of his rights.
Identification of the putative father can be made by the courts with
minimal invasion of the unwed mother's privacy. The court can restrict the
scope of the questions asked of the mother to those most likely to reveal
the putative father's name.1 5 If the unwed mother refuses to provide the
court with his name, the court should examine the circumstances surrounding
her reluctance to cooperate. If she is unable to name him because she
herself does not know his identity, she should not be penalized. t 59 If,
however, the court determines that she is simply refusing to name the
putative father, then the court should consider taking steps that would
either compel identification, or deny placement of the child.' 6°
Once the name of the putative father is known, notice should be given
to him in the manner most likely to result in actual notice. If an address
is provided, this goal can be achieved with service by mail or personal
service to the last known address. If the whereabouts of the putative father
are unknown, then service by publication should be pursued. 16' While

156. It is not clear that the stigma once associated with illegitmate births exists today as a
TEE LAW OF Domsssc RELATIONS IN TM UNITED
STATES 852 & n.21 (2d ed. 1988); see also infra note 163 and accompanying text.
157. See Note, Process, supra note 155, at 127-29 ("Because the interests of a third party,
the child, are at stake, the issue of disclosure is broader than individual privacy."). Absent
the presence of factors which would result in forseeable harm to the child, the child should
be allowed to enjoy the biological ties responsible for his or her existence. These factors could
include conviction for sexual abuse, molestation, incest or rape. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §
31-3-1-6 (g)(2) (Bums 1989).
158. This inquiry could be expanded to those persons most likely to possess knowledge of
the putative father's identity. The UPUFA takes this approach and requires the court to
inquire whether the unwed mother was married or living with someone at the time of conception,
whether she has received support payments in connection with the pregnancy, and whether she
has named the father or any man has acknowledged himself as such. UPUFA §3 (e)(I)-(5),
9B U.L.A. 27-28 (Supp. 1988).
159. An unwed mother who has been raped or who engages in a promiscuous lifestyle may
be unable to identify the putative father. If she is able to identify with some certainty a
number of men who might be the biological father of the child, each should be afforded
notice of the adoption proceedings. See, e.g., UNw. PARENTAGE AcT §25(e), 9B U.L.A. 287
(1973) [hereinafter UPA].
160. See Note, Process, supra note 155, at 129 ("Failure to identify [the putative father]
should be treated as contempt only if the evidence tends to show that her refusal is motivated
by a desire to deprive the [putative] father of the opportunity to assert and defend his parental
rights.").
161. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

strong behavioral inhibitor. See H. C.ARx,
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publication may infringe somewhat on the mother's and child's privacy, 62
the interest of the putative father in obtaining notice outweighs these
concerns.1 3 In addition, the privacy infringement can be minimized by
publishing notice in a discrete manner.' 64
Publication should be made in a manner most likely to reach the putative
father. The notice needs to be published only long enough to reasonably
reach the father. Thirty days should be sufficient to insure an interested
father notice of the action. 65 The notice should include the names of the
mother and the putative father, the date of the child's birth and the city
in which the child was born. 1'
If, after a putative father's rights have been terminated and an adoption
petition has been granted, the court learns that he was denied notice due
to fraud on the part of the unwed mother, or some other bad faith motive,
statutes should give trial courts the discretion to determine the best solution
to an obviously inequitable situation. If it is brought to the court's attention
shortly after placement, rescission of the petition may be the best solution.
However, it is more likely that despite the fraud, the adoption should
remain final given the state's interest in securing permanent placements and
in protecting the emotional and psychological well-being of the child. 6 7 This
decision should be based on an ad-hoc analysis of the facts surrounding
each individual case so as to achieve the best balance between the competing
interests.

162. There are statutes which require publication in fairly embarrassing terms. See H.
828 & n.79 (2d ed. 1983).
163. If the putative father does not receive notice, he will probably be unaware of the
possibility of the termination of his parental interests and fail to take action to preserve those
interests. Without a right to receive notice, the putative father's due process rights are illusory
at best because the right to be heard is one of the fundamentals of that right, which "has
little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
164. The notice should employ neutral language and include the unwed mother's name, the
putative father's name, the date and place of the child's birth and the statutory requirements
for the putative father to protect his interests.
165. If the name of the putative father is not known, notice through publication should
occur. Cf. UPUFA § 3(g) (if the identity of the father is not known after inquiry, the court
may order publication "only if, on the basis of all information available, the court determines
that the publication or posting is likely to lead to actual notice."). It should be sufficient to
publish a notice for sixty to ninety days in areas most likely to result in notice. Cf. IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-3-1-6.1(b)(2) (Bums Supp. 1989) (requiring publication and response within thirty
days). This would not hinder the state's interest in placing illegitimate children in adoptive
homes as children do not lose their "appeal" for the purpose of adoption until they are over
one year of age. Caban, 441 U.S. at 404 n.7.
166. Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6.1 (b)(1) (Bums Supp. 1989); Note, Process, supra note
155, at 130 (notice "must contain the mother's name but need not identify the child or
adoptive parents.").
167. See U.P.A. § 25 (d) and comment, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973). See generally ILL. Am.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 1513 (Smith-Hurd 1988).
KRAUSE, FAimEY LAW
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B.

Equal Protection Considerations: Consent

Once notice has been given, the focus of the adoption proceeding shifts
to obtaining consent from the relevent parties. While statutes routinely give
unwed mothers, married parents and various state agencies an absolute veto
6
power over the adoption of the child, the unwed father has no such power.
Most states have enacted adoption statutes that create classifications of
parents whose consent is required for the adoption of a child. 69 A majority
70
of states require the consent of only certain classes of putative fathers.
In addition, statutes typically distinguish between the putative father and
the unwed mother on the basis of biological differences between the sexes
and the belief that unwed mothers have a greater capacity or desire to care
7
for their children.' '
The Supreme Court has held that statutes which make such distinctions
"may not constitutionally be applied ...where the mother and father are
172
in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child."
Thus, a putative father's right to veto the adoption of his child depends
upon the analysis of the comparative strengths of the respective relationships.
The problem with this "relationship" standard is that it places putative
173
fathers in an almost no-win situation in cases involving newborn children.
Assuming that the putative father is told of the pregnancy, the putative
father starts out with a clear disadvantage due to purely biological differences between men and women. In one sense, an unwed mother begins to
develop a relationship with her child from the moment of conception. She

168. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
169. See e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248; Caban, 441 U.S. at 380; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
170. See Note, Analytical Survey, supra note 23, at 1059-62 (in 1979 eight states required
the consent of all putative fathers; twenty-nine states required the consent of some putative
fathers; eight states did not require the consent of the putative father).
171. See Martin, Fathersand Families:Expanding the FamilialRights of Men, 36 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 1265, 1267-68 (1986) (" 'nothing [could] be an adequate substitute for motherly love,
for that constant ministration required during the period of nurture that only a mother can
give.'

").

172. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267.
173. This problem stems from the fact that unwed mothers can easily frustrate putative
fathers' attempts to establish relationships with their children. The unwed mother can refuse
to marry the putative father and thereby deny him the legal status which would protect his
interest. See, e.g., Caban, 441 U.S. at 407 n.14; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263 ("The most effective
protection of the putative father's opportunity to develop a relationship with his child is
provided by the laws that authorize formal marriage and govern its consequenses."). It can
no longer be said with certainty that marriage is the first choice for unwed mothers. There is
no longer the strong stigma attached to illegitimacy as there once was. See H. CLARKc, supra
note 156, at 852 & n.21. As a result, the Court's position can, in effect, penalize putative
fathers for situations they are unable to change. It may be that putative fathers can unilaterally
legitimize their children and achieve full parental status although this varies from state to state
and is dependent upon the putative father learning of his child's existance. See e.g., Quilloin,
434 U.S. at 249 & n.4.
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must carry the child during pregnancy and is necessarily present at its birth.
The birth process can proceed quite easily without the participation of the
father. Therefore, even if the putative father knows about the pregnancy,
he is at a nine months disadvantage to the mother when a "relationship"
standard is applied.
If, on the other hand, the putative father is never told about the pregnancy
or the resulting child, he faces an even greater burden under the "relationship" standard. When a putative father is prevented by the mother from
establishing ties with the child, he is deprived of all opportunity to create
the relationship necessary to prevent termination of his rights under the
standard established in Lehr.7 4
In order to redress the inequality established by the "relationship" standard, statutes should go beyond current Supreme Court doctrine and include
provisions which strengthen the putative father's position in hearings held
to terminate his parental rights. This could be accomplished by requiring a
court to find that it would be to the child's detriment to be placed with
the putative father.7 5 The "detriment" standard would better serve the
interests of putative fathers than the "best interests" standard. Under the
"best interests" standard, if the court finds that it is in the child's best
interests to be adopted, then the putative father's parental rights may be
terminated.17 6 In fact, the "best interests" standard can often lead to
termination of the putative father's rights simply because the courts may
prefer two-parent, marital homes.17 7 The "detriment" standard would allow
courts to give greater cognizance to the interests of putative fathers.
The burden placed on putative fathers to demonstrate the existance of
relationships with their children is not as great in custody disputes involving
older children. Because of their age, the putative father has had more
opportunities to develop a relationship with these older children. If the
putative father has remained disinterested throughout the life of an older
child, the state can terminate his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment or neglect. 78 However, there remains the problem of the unwed
mother who intentionally thwarts the putative father's attempts to establish
a substantial relationship with his child. In recognition of this problem, any
presumption concerning the parental fitness of a putative father should be
rebuttable. The presumption could be rebutted by showing that the putative
father made a concerted effort to establish a relationship with his child but

174. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267.
175. See UPUFA §6 (b) (if the court finds that a bond exists between the father and child,
or that there is a justification for the lack of such a bond, it may terminate the father's rights
only "if failure to do so would be detrimental to the child.").
176. See generally Weston, supra note 64, at 697-700.
177. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6 (g)(1) (Burns Supp. 1989).
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was prevented from doing so by the actions of the mother or any other
79
interested party.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Stanley,
Quilloin, Caban and Lehr proves that the Court does not recognize a
putative father's biological relationship with his child as a full-fledged liberty
interest. Instead, the Court believes that the unwed father is fundamentally
distinguishable from unwed mothers, and wed fathers. These cases also
reflect the Court's great deference toward statutory schemes aimed at
promoting states' interests in encouraging the adoption of illegitimate children. With such deference, the Court upholds the statutes even though they
provide a minimal amount of due process and equal protection for putative
fathers.
The Court's position reflects the belief that the unwed mother will
necessarily show a greater interest and commitment to her child than would
the putative father. In contrast, the Court assumes that putative fathers will
act in direct correlation to their legal status. This position finds its roots in
the traditional view of "parenthood." It also derives from gender stereotypes
which the Court, in other areas, has scrutinized for the presence of invidious
classifications based on archaic and overbroad presuppositions about men
and women. 8 0 However, the Court has not applied its Equal Protection
doctrine to the rights of putative fathers with the same fervor.' 8 1 As a result,
the states have been free to enact statutes that give putative fathers only
minimal protection.
Because putative fathers cannot rely upon their biological bonds as a
defense to the termination of parental rights, there is no practical protection
for putative fathers' interests in newborn children, or children from whom
they have been kept apart. States should respond to this problem and enact
statutes that will preserve the rights and interests of all parties involved. It
is not disputed that the state has an important interest in the placement of
illegitimate children in adoptive homes. However, no matter what the
interest, the rights of putative fathers cannot be sacrificed in the interest of
administrative convenience or in order to spare an unwed mother embarrassment over an event she herself played a role in bringing to fruition. A

179. See Note, Process, supra note 155, at 136-37.

180. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) ("archaic

and stereotypic notions"); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) ("archaic and

overbroad"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) ("gross, stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes").
181. See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (3d ed. 1986) (the
standard employed by the Court "appear[s] to be ad hoc judgments based upon justices'
perceptions of the gender classification[s] at issue in each case.").
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balance must be sought, and ultimately achieved, which deals equitably with
the many significant and life-changing interests at stake in this controversy.

